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FEDERAL PROCEDURE-APPELLATE PRACTICE-"ExcusABLE NEGLECT" IN 
FAILING To PERFECT CRIMINAL APPEAL PROVIDES No GROUND FOR COLLATERAL 
REVIEW OF CONVICTION-After the ten-day period for filing a notice of ap-
peal from a federal criminal conviction had expired, defendant filed a 
motion under section 2255 of the Judicial Code1 to set aside his sentence 
under a conviction for armed robbery. The motion was based on the im-
proper admission of a confession given during an allegedly unlawful de-
tention. The district court denied the motion on the ground that the 
error asserted did not amount to a denial of a constitutional right and 
that only constitutional defects are subject to attack after the time for an 
appeal has expired.2 The District of Columbia court of appeals, sitting 
en bane, affirmed, three judges dissenting.8 The majority held that the 
erroneous admission of a confession alleged by the defendant was not sub-
ject to a collateral attack, and therefore could only have been raised by 
direct appeal. "Excusable neglect," which had been alleged by the defend-
ant, does not broaden the scope of the collateral remedy under section 2255 
so as to be available as a substitute for an appeal.4 On certiorari to the 
Supreme Court, held, writ dismissed as improvidently granted, three Jus-
tices dissenting. The writ had been granted upon the understanding that 
the question presented was whether the district court should have accorded 
petitioner a hearing under section 2255 when it appeared that no appeal 
had been perfected from the original judgment of conviction. After a 
thorough review of the record, including the trial transcript, it was con-
cluded that "the file and records of the case conclusively show" that peti-
tioner was entitled to no relief. Hodges v. United States, 368 U.S. 139 
(1961) (per curiam). 
The Court's decision that the defendant was entitled to no relief could 
have been supported by any one of three possible conclusions: that the 
facts alleged by the defendant did not amount to the unlawful detention 
proscribed by the McNabb-Mallory rule;5 that if the facts had constituted 
such an unlawful detention, it would still be a non-constitutional ground 
1 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958): "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established 
by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence 
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the 
court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in 
excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, 
may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the 
sentence." (Emphasis added.) 
2 United States v. Hodges, 156 F. Supp. 313 (D.D.C. 1957). 
3 Hodges v. United States, 282 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1960). 
4 The position of the dissenters was that the erroneous admission of the confession in 
this case was a constitutional defect but that unless it had been raised on appeal it could 
not be collaterally attacked. "Excusable neglect," however, was taken to relieve the bar 
to collateral review. Id. at 861. 
5 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 
332 (1943). 
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of attack and thus outside the scope of the collateral attack allowable under 
section 2255;6 or that even if the facts did allege a constitutional defect, the 
failure to appeal, when an appeal could have cured the defect, precluded 
bringing the collateral attack.7 Since the Court rejected the question 
whether the collateral review should have been allowed as not being pre-
sented in the case, it is apparent that the first conclusion was the one 
that decided the case,8 leaving unanswered the underlying problem whether 
relief may be granted to those convicted of crimes who through no fault 
of their own are deprived of the right to appeal their convictions. 
The same underlying question was presented in United States v. Robin• 
son,0 in which the defendant filed an appeal twenty-one days after being 
sentenced. The defendant alleged "excusable neglect" under rule 45(b) 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure10 and asked that he be allowed 
to file his notice of appeal outside the time allowed by rule 37.U Although 
rule 45 prohibits "enlarging" the time for taking an appeal, the court of 
appeals had assumed that receiving a late application would not constitute 
such an enlargement.12 The Supreme Court held, however, that rule 45 
precludes the acceptance of late appeals on the ground that the time limit 
of rule 37 is "mandatory and jurisdictional," and the non-enlargement pro-
6 This ground emphasizes the distinction between confessions which are the product 
of "coercion" and those which are merely obtained during an "unlawful detention." 
Compare Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) with Mallory v. United States, supra 
note 5. 
7 This was the position taken by the division of the circuit court which first heard 
the case. Two of those judges were among the dissenters on the rehearing en bane and 
argued that the "excusable neglect" urged by the petitioner was sufficient to waive the 
prerequisite appeal. The question of a federal doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is 
unsettled and its pursuit is beyond the scope of this note. Jordan v. United States, 352 
U.S. 904 (1956), suggests that constitutional issues raised for the first time on collateral 
attack will not be barred simply because not raised on prior appeal. But see Larson v. 
United States, 275 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1960); Stephenson v. United States, 257 F.2d 175 
(6th Cir. 1958); Smith v. United States, 187 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 
8 The three dissenting justices, however, assumed that the use of defendant's con-
fession was a constitutional defect, and argued that the failure to appeal such a defect did 
not bar a collateral attack upon the conviction. 368 U.S. at 140. 
o 361 U.S. 220 (1960). 
10 "When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the 
court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion • • • (2) upon motion permit the 
act to be done after the expiration of the specified period if the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect; but the court may not enlarge ••• the period for taking an 
appeal." 
11 FED. R. CRIM. P. 37(a): 
"(l} Notice of Appeal. An appeal permitted by law from a district court to a court of 
appeals is taken by filing with the clerk of the district court a notice of appeal in 
duplicate ••.. 
"(2) Time for Taking Appeal. An appeal by defendant may be taken within ten days after 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from, but if a motion for a new trial or in arrest 
or judgment has been made within the ten-day period an appeal from a judgment of 
conviction may be taken within ten days after entry of the order denying the motion .•.• " 
12 Robinson v. United States, 260 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
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vision of the rule prohibits the circuit courts from taking jurisdiction of 
appeals after that time. Defendant's argument before the court of appeals 
in the principal case was based in part on a suggestion in Robinson that 
granting late appeals is unnecessary in view of the collateral remedies 
available to redress the denial of "basic right," including the remedy 
under section 2255.13 The court of appeals held, however, that the "basic 
rights" intended by the Court were only those which had been traditionally 
redressed by collateral attack in habeas corpus, and its statutory counter-
part, section 2255. 
In general, the scope of review available by collateral attack, unlike the 
virtually unlimited scope of an appeal, is quite narrow. However, whereas 
review by appeal is limited to matters appearing in the record, a collateral 
review may consider matters extrinsic to the record and may be had "at 
any time." The collateral review under section 2255 was drafted into law 
in 1948 for the primary purpose of alleviating the habeas corpus case load 
in the federal district courts in districts where federal penitentiaries are 
located. It was also intended to provide a more convenient procedure for 
collateral review than had been theretofore available. It is generally stated 
that the scope of review available under section 2255 is the same as that 
available under habeas corpus procedure.14 The main difference is that 
the statutory remedy must be brought in the sentencing court, is limited 
to persons "under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress," and, 
in most cases, the failure to exhaust this remedy will bar a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus.15 The scope of the review available in habeas 
corpus is said to be limited to review of "jurisdictional" defects, that is, 
lack of jurisdiction over the person or over the offense, or the unconstitu-
tionality of the statute upon which a conviction is based.16 The concept 
of "jurisdictional defects" has been expanded to include other infringe-
13 Robinson v. United States, 361 U.S. 220, 230 n.14 (1961): "The allowance of an 
appeal months or years after expiration of the prescribed time seems unnecessary for 
the accomplishment of substantial justice, for there are a number of collateral remedies 
available to redress denial of basic rights. Examples are: The power of a District Court 
under Rule 35 to correct an illegal sentence at any time, and to reduce a sentence within 
60 days after the judgment of conviction becomes final; the power of a District Court 
to entertain a collateral attack upon a judgment of conviction and to vacate, set aside 
or correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255; and proceedings by way of writ of error 
coram nobis." 
14 See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210-19 (1952); Note, 73 HARV. L. REv. 
1225 (1960); Note, 34 ST. JoHN's L. REY. 81 (1959); Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1183 (1950). 
15 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958): "An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of 
a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall 
not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by 
motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, 
unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test 
the legality of his detention." 
16 See Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947). See generally Holtzoff, Collateral Review 
of Convictions in Federal Courts, 25 B.U.L. REv. 26 (1945). 
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ments of "basic rights," such as denial of assistance of counsel,17 mob 
domination of trial proceedings,18 use of perjured testimony by the prosecu-
tion,111 and, generally, where the writ is the only effective means of pre-
serving the constitutional rights of the accused.20 In addition, section 2255 
may be used to obtain review of certain specified non-jurisdictional and 
non-constitutional bases of attack, particularly illegality of a sentence.21 
Thus far, however, the scope of section 2255 has remained narrower than 
the scope of a direct appeal, and the extension urged in the principal 
case would have been a monumental departure from these precedents. 
The Robinson rule, strictly applying the time limitation for filing an 
appeal, and the rule laid down by the circuit court in the principal case, 
apparently mean that there may be a class of criminal convicts who have 
valid grounds for appeal, but who without fault of their own will be 
found to have waived their right to appeal by not having the required 
notice filed within the ten-day period allowed by rule 37. The right to an 
appeal from a criminal conviction, though relatively new in our juris-
prudence,22 has become a substantial right in present-day criminal pro-
cedure.23 It would seem that waiver of a right so important to the per-
sonal liberty of the individuals involved should not lightly be assumed. 
If it can be assumed that there may be cases which will present instances 
of neglect which are in fact "excusable," the situation strongly suggests 
that some relief should be provided for the unwary convict with a meri-
torious claim to be asserted on appeal. Obviously such a suggestion raises 
a specter of manifold abuses by the criminal convicts who now deluge 
the courts with groundless petitions for collateral review.24 But this alone 
is not sufficient reason for denying a particular petitioner relief from his 
"excusable" neglect and the loss of a possible right to preserve his freedom. 
Two alternatives suggest themselves: the first would be to amend rule 
45 to allow an enlargement of the time for filing notice of an appeal upon 
a showing of "excusable neglect," in much the same manner as attempted in 
Robinson. The appellant could be allowed a hearing before the district 
court, as was actually done in the Robinson case, in which he would have 
17 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); United States v. Morgan, 222 F.2d 673 
(2d Cir. 1955). 
18 See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). 
19 See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). Compare Sears v. United States, 265 
F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1959), and Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1938), with Hodge 
v. Huff, 140 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1944), and Casebeer v. Hudspeth, 121 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 
1941). 
20 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942). 
21 Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958). 
22 See Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 400 (1957). 
23 See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 
20 (1956). 
24 See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1948). 
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the burden of showing the excusability of his failure to file the notice within 
the allotted time. Some reasonable time limitation, consistent with a claim 
of "excusable neglect," could be established within which this petition 
would have to be brought.25 Upon establishing the excusable neglect the 
appellant would be allowed to proceed with his appeal as in any other 
case brought within the initial time limit. The second possibility would 
be to allow a "broadening" of the scope of the collateral review available 
under section 2255, as urged in the principal case, to provide review for 
convicts who had failed, through no fault of their own, to give notice of 
appeal within the required time. If section 2255 were broadened to serve 
as an appellate vehicle for this class of convicts, the temptation to make 
use of this alternate method of appeal would be great and would inevitably 
lead to abuse. A court would be urged to make a more comprehensive 
inquiry into a petitioner's trial than is presently allowed by appeal, since 
the petitioners could logically raise all the grounds of attack within the 
scope of an appeal and could also bring in matters extrinsic to the record 
in accordance with the practice established for collateral review. This 
could conceivably lead to undermining the basic principle that only those 
matters raised at trial may be considered on appeal. The policy that the 
orderly administration of justice demands the prompt settlement of the 
merits of a person's conviction, which supports the present rule limiting 
the time for filing appeals, would not suffer the suggested relief to be 
extended so far. It would seem, therefore, that if relief is to be extended 
to the criminal convict who is deprived of an appeal, a modification of 
rule 45 would be the more practicable. Once the "excusable neglect" was 
established in the trial court hearing, the case would be sent up to the 
appellate court in the normal manner, where the scope and extent of 
review would be the same as the appellant would have had but for his 
delay in filing his notice of appeal, and the departure from existing prac-
tice would be minimized. 
It is not to be assumed that opening the door to "excusably" late ap-
peals will inevitably lead to an additional deluge of spurious attacks on 
criminal convictions. In the first place the grounds of appeal asserted 
would have to appear in the record as now required, and a defendant 
would be allowed but a single chance to have his conviction reviewed by 
this method.26 Secondly, a defendant will have to prove that his neglect 
was in fact "excusable." It is clear that if the court or other agents of 
the government take affirmative action which positively prevents a de-
25 See Note, 39 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 102 (1960), for a discussion of an analogous provision 
in Texas criminal procedure. 
26 Clearly a standard would have to be established to curb successive applications 
asserting different contrived grounds for "excusable neglect." But compare the abuse-
limiting method provided in § 2255, quoted note 15 supra. 
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fendant from bringing his appeal, it will serve to relieve the defendant 
from the requirement that his appeal be brought within the statutory time 
limit.27 On the other hand, where a defendant has been simply indifferent 
toward his own rights, no relief should be provided. Between these ex-
tremes, it is submitted, neglect may be found which should be deemed 
"excusable." The interpretation of "excusable neglect" which has been 
developed so far under rule 45 seems to indicate that some degree of court 
responsibility for the neglect involved is required.28 Thus, at the point 
at which a defendant's practical opportunity to appeal has been infringed, 
relief from the time limit should be afforded. In Robinson the Supreme 
Court observed that strong policy arguments supported greater flexibility 
with respect to the time for taking an appeal, but that the relief must be 
provided through the Court's rule-making process.29 Hopefully, the pos-
sibility for great unfairness under the present rules will provide the stimulus 
for the Court to take such action. 
H. C. Snyder, Jr. 
27 In Dowd v. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951), action of state prison officials preventing 
petitioner from sending appeal papers out of prison until after time for appeal had 
expired was held denial of equal protection of the law. 
28 See Blunt v. United States, 244 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1957), and cases cited in annota-
tion to FED. R. CRIM. P. 45, in 18 U.S.C.A. Appendix (Supp. 1961). 
20 361 U.S. at 229. 
